



## **Military and Internal Security Operations in Emerging Democracies: Strategies, Challenges, and Implications for National Stability**

**Oluwadamilare OLAWOLE<sup>1</sup>, Bolaji OMITOLA<sup>1</sup>, & Adebowale ADEYEYE<sup>1</sup>**

**<sup>1</sup>Department of Political Sciences, Osun State University, Osogbo, Nigeria.**

**Corresponding Author's Email: olawoleluwadamilare4@gmail.com**

---

### **Abstract**

Internal security frameworks require military operation to defend against threats originating from inside domestic territory like insurgencies and terrorist groups together with organized criminal organizations. The research defines military deployment methods alongside deployment barriers to evaluate the impact of governance on internal security development in democratic nations. The study relies on qualitative data with a Secondary source in gathering data which serves to perform exploratory research and evaluates military operation dynamics and governance effects while exploring security measures against individual rights protection. The research demonstrates Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab response by Nigerian and Kenyan military forces through the examination of distinct operational methods. Security operations generate multiple enduring problems through their threat reduction efforts since they reveal institutional failures alongside economic limitations and human violations of rights. Security initiatives fail to reach enduring targets because of poor coordination between different agencies alongside weak institutions and restricted local expertise. The research demonstrates civilian control stands essential for military operations because it provides communities access to address security threats at their origin. Secure governance systems serving national defense and democratic strength require continuous implementation to provide long-lasting national security together with democratic strength by ensuring both organizational success and factual oversight of internal threat management.

**Keywords:** Internal security operations, national stability, democracy, military operations

---

### **Introduction**

A nation requires fundamental security measures to protect its annexed people, institutions and facilities from threats stemming from insurgencies, terrorism, organized crime, cyber-attacks and economic sabotage. Incompetent authorities requiring additional civilian security forces maintain their dependence on military forces for domestic security because their limited resources stem from dysfunctional institutions and poor national infrastructure. Government dependency on military strength and operational abilities leads to crucial problems (Adefisoye,2020).

Throughout history military participation in civil matters has steadily increased the chance of both authoritarian governance and human rights violations and political meddling (Adefisoye, 2020). The presence of military institutions and the absence of civilian oversight in democratic development structures eventually weakens public trust and governance systems because of military intervention. Security operations conducted by military forces received widespread criticism due to their excessive force and unlawful killing practices that included viewpoint suppression which triggered extended instability and humanitarian disasters starting from Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria then Al-Shabaab conflict in Kenya (Dauda & Ukaeje, 2024).



International human rights standards constantly clash with security operational needs resulting in a significant administrative challenge for government bodies. International monitoring bodies alongside human rights associations strongly disagree with the collateral damage and weakened civil liberties together with displaced citizens that forces generate during military operations (Associated Press, 2025). The growing reliance on military internal security methods leads to dual problems involving weakened civilian police functions and increased military authority and structural changes between military and civilian sectors (Adefisoye, 2019). Transnational security threats like terrorism and organized crime demand regional and international collaboration. The Multinational Joint Task Force enables Nigeria to participate in counterinsurgency operations jointly with Chad and Niger and Cameroon and Kenya receives backing from African Union Mission in Somalia. Security threats of today prove their complex nature by union work between military agencies while revealing substantial hurdles for maintaining security goals across operations worldwide (Afrobarometer, 2016).

Military internal security operations between Nigeria and Kenya receive analysis for their approaches through detailed security assessments. Military actions used by these countries reshaped their security situations by analyzing political and social aspects together with monetary considerations and local involvement. The article investigates the unforeseen effects that occur during militarization events which include civil liberties erosion and forced population relocation alongside political control infringements (Adefisoye, 2020). This research investigates security conditions to explain military engagement in internal security by developing policies that secure democracy and respect human rights. Strong internal security management requires strengthening law enforcement capacities while improving civil oversight systems in addition to regional cooperation for protecting democratic institutions in new democracies (Munuve, 2024). The study relies primarily on Secondary data which serves to perform exploratory research and evaluates military operation dynamics and governance effects while exploring security measures against individual rights protection.

## Literature Review

### The Concept of Military, Internal Security Operations and Democracy

Having a clear definition enables better comprehension of military operations in both internal security domains and democratic structures. A government-mandated military organization with lethal authorization must stay politically detached and follow civilian authorities in democratic states (Croissant et al. (2010).

Internal security requires national actions at home for maintaining legal order and defending against insurgencies and terrorist threats. Handling security measures against human rights violations remains an essential difficulty for authorities in countries shifting from authoritarian rule to democracy (Derdzinski, 2009). To ensure democracy functions properly elected institutions alongside civilian military control should exist over security forces (Larry, 1999). Learning to integrate democratic principles poses challenges for newly formed democracies as institution weaknesses make governments deploy military troops for home security duties (Luckham 2003).

Military intervention within domestic territories creates obscurity by merging law enforcement functions with defense tasks thus jeopardizing democratic advancement (Derdzinski, 2009). Extended military



oversight has a negative effect on the development of institutional structures. Security sector reform is vital. The definition of military involvement in internal operations should be explicit through legal guidelines while increased police capabilities would reduce military dependency. Protecting democratic governance requires implementing these steps (Olasunkanmi 2016).

### **Military and Internal Security Operations**

Military involvement in internal security duties continues to increase worldwide because governments focus on combatting terrorism and insurgency as well as domestic instability challenges. Kaldor (2012) explains that current warfare patterns have led to "new wars" which produce mixed internal and external security hazards and force military forces to handle domestic policing functions. This temporary security approach puts democratic institutions and fundamental liberties at risk (Avant and DeNevers 2011). Military personnel in Africa operate more frequently as internal security units because institutionally weak systems encounter persistent violence together with inadequate police capabilities. Aning and Atuobi (2009) explain the military takeovers typically occur due to countering electoral violence and terrorism. Equal supervision from civilian institutions is vital to avoid waste through abuse patterns which deteriorate public confidence in democratic institutions (Williams 2016). The military initiative Operation Lafiya Dole served as fundamental in regaining Nigerian territory from Boko Haram control. Operation Lafiya Dole has triggered numerous civilian deaths as well as large population moves and severe human rights violations (Alozieuwa, 2019). The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) lead the fight against Al-Shabaab after 2013 Westgate attack as the primary military force in Kenya. Border enforcement operations receive support (Kagwanja 2012). Also, there were concerns about management problems and unintended negative effects. Mali demonstrates a prime situation where military actions within the nation resulted in both benefits and negative effects. International partners and domestic political forces united in retaliation against insurgent groups after the 2012 uprising. Heavily aggressive military responses should be considered according to Lecocq and Schrijver (2007) since they can augment local grievances which results in prolonged violence and disrupted peace initiatives.

The national army of Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) runs internal security operations throughout the eastern provinces since a long time. The region stays unstable according to Stearns (2012) because state and non-state military actors abuse local populations even with an ongoing military presence there. Internal security militarization within the DRC encounters two key criticisms about accountability issues and its incapability to shield civilians. The extended presence of military forces without sufficient oversight creates an essential dilemma for African and worldwide security governance as it damages democratic norms and intensifies dangerous situations.

### **Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab Response by Nigerian and Kenyan Military Forces**

The military strategies utilized for combating Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Kenya vary between each other due to the features of these insurgencies along with the regional dynamics and military operational capacity. The Nigerian military conducts operations against Boko Haram in northern territories while Kenyan military forces target terrorists who cross from Somalia. The northeastern Nigerian insurgency led by Boko Haram has made the Nigerian military employ airstrikes and raids while conducting community outreach programs. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) has established regional cooperation to support the Nigerian military but their efforts continue facing logistical problems



alongside coordination problems as well as human rights violations (Onuoha, 2015; Adebayo, 2020). The excessive use of force by military forces has developed strong resentment within local communities thus enabling Boko Haram to maintain its insurgency.

The Kenyan military operates in southern Somalia against Al-Shabaab insurgents while primarily supporting its role as a member of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Operation Linda Nchi launched by the Kenyan military to fight Al-Shabaab intrusions into Kenyan territory has failed to achieve its targets as the attacks continue in Kenyan territory. The Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) experience trouble with intelligence failures and logistical challenges in addition to gaining value through regional cooperation within AMISOM (Omondi, 2012). Although these countries conduct military activities with counterinsurgency strategies, they implement different methods that produce varying results. The Nigerian military deals with coordination barriers together with terrain obstacles but Kenya experiences Al-Shabaab attacks even after achieving territorial gains. Bunte & Nilles (2021) point out that the militaries from both countries experience human rights problems and asymmetric warfare challenges that require unified political and military and economic strategies.

### **Theoretical Review**

The research bases its approach on securitization theory according to Buzan et al. (1998) to understand state agencies' methods of creating threats to endorse special security actions. Through the labeling of terrorism along with insurgency and organized crime as existential dangers governments gain authorization to conduct military operations outside democratic procedures and institutions. The countries of Nigeria and Kenya see their respective security threats of Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab paved the way for military personnel to take primary responsibility in domestic security operations (Gavin 2024).

Securitization allows military actors to seize control over civilian authority thus creating decreased oversight alongside dissent suppression as well as infringing upon constitutional rights (Adefisoye, 2021; Caroline, 2020). Emergency military reactions that occur frequently result in democratic institution degradation and military power solidifying its position within civilian administration (Maurice 2020; Derradji & Madouni 2022). The process of democratic decline continues indefinitely alongside enhanced state control of citizens and the redirection of public money from development initiatives to law enforcement (Abrahamsen & Williams, 2011; Associated Press, 2025). New democracies can use Securitization theory to evaluate the democratic effects of armed forces directing their internal security responses. Repetitive terrorist threat framing by authorities leads to authoritarian rule disguised as national security (Ketter, 2022; Cordova, 2025).

### **Methodology**

The analytical framework of this research involves a qualitative method and exploratory design for comprehensive examination of the study subject. The academic research uses secondary data from scholarly articles and official documents alongside policy material and archival records as well as news reports and predefined databases. The researchers used thematic analysis for analyzing results based on the established research questions.



### **Counterinsurgency and Intelligence Strategies**

Using the "clear-hold-build" COIN model means combining the removal of insurgents with security controls and local community governance. Nigeria along with other counterinsurgency tactics recovered important territories from Boko Haram and ISWAP traction while causing devastating losses of over 35,000 civilian lives and displacing more than two million people (Associated Press, 2025). Kenya implemented Operation Linda Nchi in 2011 before handing control to AMISOM (Moe 2018). For successful operations in both countries advanced technology and intelligence collection form critical elements. Modern surveillance technology including drones along with satellites and cyber-intelligence systems delivers more effective operations by improving precision targeting. The Nigerian and Kenyan military employs reconnaissance drones together with night-vision systems and digital spy technology to conduct offensive attacks against insurgents as they protect critical infrastructure (Watts et al., 2017).

Public trust in Nigeria has diminished because of unethical conduct and excessive military force use which resulted in lower public approval and weakened alliance between civilians and the military (Umar & Adamu, 2025). Peaceful resolutions will remain elusive unless poverty and governance deficiencies alongside ethnic tensions are resolved (Okoli & Orinya, 2022). Public trust is key. Operations that use excessive force together with biases drive communities to disconnect from security entities. COIN operations succeed when national forces both military and civilians work together through open systems. Governance in Nigeria becomes worse due to inefficient bureaucracy and agency conflicts as reported by (International Crisis Group 2019). Operation effectiveness suffers from two main challenges: outdated equipment combined with insufficient funding. Military forces deployed for long periods of time eventually establish violent standards that harm democratic values. Peaceful sustainability requires Nigeria and Kenya to remove military control from governance alongside developing their democratic structures.

### **Implications For National Stability**

New democratic nations such as Nigeria together with Kenya struggle to properly manage their military forces who engage in domestic security work. The long-term military occupation of civil operations leads to economic strain and weakens both democratic structures while reducing civilian control abilities (Ojo, 2023). Kenyan elections strained democratic legitimacy because military forces frequently take election security roles (Arriola et al. 2021). Security operations directed by the military forces typically bring deteriorating economic developments. The anti-banditry initiatives alongside the Boko Haram counter-terrorism efforts in Nigeria resulted in mass displacement while simultaneously damaging infrastructure and intensifying economic disparities across the nation (Aina 2023, Moe 2018).

The lengthening of military presence in domestic activities leads to political system breakdowns while reflecting worldwide trends that result in democracies becoming controlled by armed forces and undermining human rights protection and public confidence (Omelicheva et.al 2017 ). The participation of foreign forces in Nigeria's regional Boko Haram alliance causes questions about sovereignty along with diminished public trust (Moe 2018). Long-term military dominance leads to deterioration of democratic development. The establishment of a strategic plan which addresses fundamental conflict elements alongside civilian control practices represents the vital foundation for achieving lasting stability (Ojo, 2023).



## **Military and Internal Security Operations in New Democracies**

### **Nigeria – The Boko Haram Insurgency**

Boko Haram poses the biggest challenge to security and national stability throughout the northeastern part of Nigeria. The Nigerian military muses its capabilities to combat Boko Haram insurgents through extensive counterinsurgency efforts while it attempts to resume abandoned regions and restore governmental leadership to contested territories. Internal security operations can achieve success in military territory gains which demonstrates both counterinsurgency effectiveness and the insurgent persistence under new democratic conditions (Campbell & Harwood, 2018; International Crisis Group, 2024).

As per COIN principles Nigeria adopts a "clear-hold-build" tactic for clearing Boko Haram positions after which it secures local governance structures and infrastructure. Nigerian forces have impeded Boko Haram operations through coordinated drone surveillance and special units that hunted down Boko Haram leaders (Callahan 2016). The conflict persists because Boko Haram has adapted its fighting approaches to defeat Enemy Adaptation tactics successfully. The enduring provision of local governance presents a critical COIN problem in Nigeria after military forces have retaken control of their territory. The military demonstrates a separate competence in regaining occupied land from insurgents even when it lacks the skills required to tackle poverty-driven insurgency issues caused by unemployment and government corruption (Kaldor 2012).

The areas where civilian institutions failed to deliver services successfully offer Boko Haram an opportunity to control this ground because public discontent with government service failures persists. Both human rights violations and unlawful civilian death and population relocation by Nigerian military forces contribute to public opposition against security personnel and reduce their ability to gain public cooperation (Abimbola, 2020).

Internal instability spread through Nigeria after the Boko Haram insurgency precipitated millions of displacements and damaged national infrastructure and exhausted governmental resources. According to Iweze and Sanni (2019) military strategic actions against Boko Haram have superseded social reform efforts thus impeding national stability. Ongoing violent activities from Boko Haram confirm the necessity of developing multiple security approaches to protect Nigeria's internal safety. Multiple successful transition approaches require immediate deployment starting with sustained support to local residents followed by state institution fix-ups and security function enhancements for involving forces during withdrawal. The military must continue its current operations and existing development programs must focus on improving effective governance in combination with essential services delivery throughout affected zones.

### **Case Study: Kenya – The Al-Shabaab Threat**

Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks on Kenya have transformed into the nation's principal domestic security problem because the organization maintains its main base in Somalia. The Kenyan military carries out extensive military operations against threats by joining the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). National counter-terrorism programs within Kenya use intelligence efforts with local cooperation programs together with cultural soft-power initiatives (Callahan, 2016).



Noteworthy military accomplishments show that fighting through combat operations alone fails to permanently eliminate the terrorist activities of Al-Shabaab in Kenya. Kenya fights Al-Shabaab by using three different strategies which include launching military deployment along frontiers and implementing local-based preventive programs to block radicalization attempts. The military executes two-fold strategic monitoring by focusing protection efforts on vital regions in northeastern border territories with coastal areas together with international partnership development to disconnect the Al-Shabaab network spanning across the Horn of Africa. The AMISOM component enables Kenya to back Ethiopian and Ugandan troops in Somalia-led operations resulting in major reductions of Al-Shabaab control regions although the group maintains isolated border attacks aimed at Kenya (Iweze & Sanni, 2019).

The impressive military achievements of Kenya continue to encounter numerous substantial difficulties. For territory growth the extremist organization needs to handle regional conflicts with success and enlist militant fighters from underrepresented ethnic groups. The militant group appeals to Kenyan youth who believe Al-Shabaab fights against discrimination along with poverty in the northeastern region. The Somali population near Kenyan territory feels helpless because Kenyan soldiers render their local leaders unable to manage regional affairs (International Crisis Group, 2016).

A single military approach does not create lasting security unless the foundational social structures and political systems behind radicalization get adequate treatment. The military operations in Kenya succeeded in resolving fundamental factors of extremism including unemployment and governance failures yet their impact remains inadequate. The security response demands an inclusive holistic structure which combines national defense systems with societal governance as well as political and economic development mechanisms to fight Al-Shabaab attacks (State Department, 2022).

The ongoing danger from Al-Shabaab terrorists creates multiple stability threats that harm multiple sectors of national functioning in Kenya. The regular Al-Shabaab assaults cause massive casualties and devastation that affects all segments of civilian and military forces together with national infrastructure. Northeastern trade activities and tourism industries in Kenya have faced adverse economic impacts caused by security concerns and interrupted trade operations. The military must collaborate with improved governance and development to achieve border security although this approach remains insufficient (International Crisis Group, 2019).

## **Discussion and Analysis**

Compelling reasons call for military engagement in internal security monitoring since emerging democratic nations need this characteristic to manage violent insurgencies together with terrorism and internal conflicts. Security goals require Counterinsurgency operations to work together with basic direct military utilities and intelligence-based systems. The permanence of security threats reduction methods depends directly on political control over economic matters and social advancement initiatives in implementation settings. The analysis of Boko Haram in Nigeria and anti-Al-Shabaab operations in Kenya against internal terrorism demonstrate contrasting approaches as they examine mutual challenges affecting stability along with governmental control. The case examinations show similar support of COIN techniques and prioritize executing the "clear-hold-build" standard. This strategic maneuver allows forces to take back areas that insurgents control and defeat their fighters to restore authority of state



governments. The strategy produces only limited results because of existing weak governance structures. Although the Nigerian military gained battlefield success against Boko Haram through COIN operations the insurgency persists because Nigeria demonstrates its commitment to creative counter-terror approaches through Intel drone operations and specialized military units although these strategies have failed to eliminate insurgencies (Iweze & Sanni, 2019).

Cyber-surveillance and human intelligence are vital in all these cases because their joint operation enables both the detection and interception of insurgent movements. The military advancements attained by these programs produce temporary results because actual solutions to extremism need systematic political interventions against poverty and governance deficiencies and unemployment challenges (Kaldor, 2012). National stability emerges from a joint operation between military measures and governance system enhancements together with social-economic development activities.

### **Challenges in Military-Driven Internal Security Operations**

The task of internal security demands military operation leadership in developing democracies such as Nigeria and Kenya to fight terrorism. The operations encounter performance-related problems stemming from human rights violations and decreased civilian supervision and diminished public trust. By engaging in Boko Haram counterinsurgency activities Nigerian forces have conducted unlawful killings together with population removals and destroyed infrastructure which generated anger leading people to embrace radicalism. The execution of warfare against Al-Shabaab in Kenya revealed corresponding patterns of mistreatment which critically affected civilian backing. Public trust is also crucial. The public opinion in these two nations has begun to doubt the actions of their military personnel. Many Nigerians regard their military forces as external entities which do not establish profound peace so civilians maintain doubt of Kenyan forces after the Westgate Mall incident. Military operations become less effective and long-term security becomes more challenging when forces lack trust from the population.

Operation success in Nigeria and Kenya becomes challenging due to limited coordination between the military and civilian leadership. The counterinsurgency missions against Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab face obstacles from organizational mismanagement alongside poor interaction with local government authorities. The achievement of military victory does not bring lasting peace because authorities neglect to address fundamental problems such as governmental shortcomings and inequality and political discrimination. The northeastern region of Nigeria provides Boko Haram with its base because government institutions fail to function adequately but Al-Shabaab retains authority in Kenya by holding unresolved grievances against the state.

According to Kaldor (2012), security only endures when social and political disparities receive attention. Mostly pushing military forces into battle is inadequate since effective results necessitate unification of military operations with programs for development and governance reform initiatives. Sustainable peace hinges on three pillars: strong governance, inclusive policies, and economic development.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Nigeria and Kenya use their military forces as a crucial yet troublesome component of their internal security operations. Terrorist group elimination through military actions together with territorial



reconquest succeeds yet fails to generate sustained effects on national stability maintenance beyond the operation period. Security prevention through military measures alone remains inadequate because it faces three critical barriers: poor governance, human rights violations and lacking civilian support.

Comparative analysis reveals recurring issues. Tactical goals are achieved through counterinsurgency combined with intelligence-driven operations although these approaches fail to resolve underlying issues including poor economics and political segregation together with inadequate administrative control. Politicians decrease their trust in military forces after reports emerge about human rights abuses and civilian deaths alongside population relocation activities. Similar to existing counterinsurgency doctrine people fail to endorse the military as watchdogs of civil matters thereby blocking vital support from local populations necessary for insurgency operations. When militant operations do not link with governance restructuring, they create sustained environmental conditions which generate insecurity.

Total governance transformation requires security initiatives to act as integrated components because they must detect fundamental security threats and military forces must develop authentic ties with local residents. A sustainable peace exists through the creation of robust institutions combined with economic progress in society. To this, the policy recommendation is that both military forces and police personnel and civilian staff should unite under single integrated missions which perform security functions together with governmental reform programs. Effective collaboration between military forces and civilian organizations will improve when military and civilian groups establish clear responsibilities and transparent communication practices.

There should be the transition back to civilian control whenever military involvement becomes limited to brief intervention periods. Both law enforcement and governing institutions need strong development to stop insurgent activities which promotes stability across the area. Also, Human rights standards in decision-making process need military staff training before independent organizations to conduct human rights oversight to stop severe discipline practices and build lasting community trust.

The development of security-focused programs needs to improve educational and healthcare systems and establish economic opportunities specifically designed for the community. Community participation enables both trust development between marginalized groups and society as well as a reduction in the frequency of extremist actions. Civilians should take control after emergencies as part of their defined process to rebuild civilian structures. Peace stability in conflict-affected areas depends on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration programs that focus on weapons removal and soldier deactivation and resumption of civilian life.

## References

- Abimbola, O. (2020). Human rights violations in Nigeria's counter-Boko Haram operations. *African Security Review*, 29(1), 18–35.
- Abrahamsen, R., & Williams, M. C. (2011). *Security beyond the state: Private security in international politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Adebayo, A. (2020). The Nigerian military's counterinsurgency tactics: A critical assessment. *African Security Review*, 29(3), 240–255.



- Adefisoye, O. A. (2019). Military deployment in internal security operations and civil-military relations in a democracy: The Nigerian experience.
- Adefisoye, T. (2020). Military deployment in internal security operations and civil-military relations in a democracy: The Nigerian experience. *European Journal of Political Science Studies*, 4(1).  
<https://oapub.org/soc/index.php/EJPSS/article/view/538>
- Adefisoye, T. (2021). Military deployment in internal security operations and civil-military relations in a democracy: The Nigerian experience. *European Journal of Political Science Studies*.  
<https://oapub.org>
- Afrobarometer. (2016). Injustice and (In)Security: Public perceptions of Nigeria and Kenya's security forces and their implications for the fight against violent extremism.
- Aina, F. (2023). Forces of terror: Armed banditry and insecurity in north-west Nigeria. *Democracy and Security*.  
[https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/files/77870994/Forces\\_of\\_Terror\\_Armed\\_Banditry\\_and\\_Insecurity\\_in\\_North\\_west\\_Nigeria.pdf](https://researchportal.port.ac.uk/files/77870994/Forces_of_Terror_Armed_Banditry_and_Insecurity_in_North_west_Nigeria.pdf)
- Alozieuwa, S. H. O. (2019). Counterinsurgency in Nigeria: The Military and Operations against Boko Haram. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 54(5), 705–722.
- Aning, K., & Atuobi, S. (2009). Security, elections and post-2007 violence in Kenya. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 27(3), 275–291.
- Associated Press. (2025). Several civilians killed in Nigeria by military airstrike targeting rebels, officials say. Associated Press. <https://apnews.com/article/9f97fb91d5d58ed09e93d78cff399b20>
- Associated Press. (2025). Nigeria extremists kill dozens of farmers, abduct many more in Borno state. *AP News*. <https://apnews.com/article/3579523f5f1b978ea7d32b4374c8e036>
- Arriola, L. R., Dow, D. A., Matanock, A. M., & Mattes, M. (2021). Policing institutions and post-conflict peace. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 65(10), 1738–1763.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/002200272110130>
- Avant, D. D., & DeNevers, R. (2011). Military contractors and the American way of war. *Daedalus*, 140(3), 88–99.
- Bunte, P., & Nilles, A. (2021). The limits of military power: Counterinsurgency in Africa. *Journal of African Security*, 16(2), 1–17.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & de Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: A new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Callahan, D. (2016). *Counterinsurgency and human rights: The case of Nigeria*. Cambridge University Press.
- Campbell, J., & Harwood, A. (2018). Boko Haram's deadly impact. Council on Foreign Relations.  
<https://www.cfr.org/article/boko-harams-deadly-impact>
- Caroline. (2020). Securitization is normal politics: Epistemological insights from Kenya's forced migration and security experience.
- Cordova, A. (2025). The tech revolution and irregular warfare: Leveraging commercial innovation for great power competition. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).  
<https://www.csis.org/analysis/tech-revolution-and-irregular-warfare-leveraging-commercial-innovation-great-power>
- Croissant, A., Kuehn, D., Chambers, P., & Wolf, S. O. (2010). Beyond the fallacy of coup-ism: Conceptualizing civilian control of the military in emerging democracies. *Democratization*, 17(5),



- 950–975. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2010.501180>
- Dauda, S., & Ukaeje, O. (2024). An appraisal of Multinational Joint Task Force and counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin. *University of Nigeria Journal of Political Economy*, 14(1).  
<https://www.unjpe.com/index.php/UNJPE/article/view/251>
- Derdzinski, J. L. (2009). *Internal security services in liberalizing states: Transitions, turmoil, and (in)security*. Routledge.
- Derradji, H., & Madouni, A. (2022). *The securitisation of development in Africa: Causes, mechanism, and consequences*. National Security and the Future.
- Gavin, M. (2024). Kenya's protests mark a generational revolution in the country's politics. *Africa in Transition & Africa Program: A Sea Change in Kenya*. Council on Foreign Relations.
- International Crisis Group. (2012). *The Kenyan military intervention in Somalia (Africa Report No. 184)*.  
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenyan-military-intervention-somalia>
- International Crisis Group. (2019). *The hidden cost of Al-Shabaab's campaign in north-eastern Kenya*.  
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/hidden-cost-al-shabaabs-campaign-north-eastern-kenya>
- International Crisis Group. (2024). *JAS vs. ISWAP: The war of the Boko Haram splinters (Africa Briefing No. 28)*
- Iweze, O., & Sanni, M. (2019). The impact of military operations on civilian governance: A study of Nigeria's counter-insurgency efforts. *Journal of African Political Studies*, 12(4), 67–84.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/22145698.2019.1552713>
- Kagwanja, P. (2012). Counter-terrorism in Kenya: Security, civil liberties and the rule of law. *African Human Security Initiative Report*. [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136493/ahsi\\_kagwanja.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/136493/ahsi_kagwanja.pdf)
- Kaldor, M. (2012). *New and old wars: Organised violence in a global era* (3rd ed.). Stanford University Press. [https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/654678/mod\\_resource/content/1/kaldor%20-%20old%20and%20new%20wars.pdf](https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/654678/mod_resource/content/1/kaldor%20-%20old%20and%20new%20wars.pdf)
- Kaldor, M. (2012). *New and old wars: Organized violence in a global era* (3rd ed.). Polity Press.
- Ketter, J. K. (2022). *Military involvement in internal security operation: An assessment of the Kenya Defence Forces in terrorism operations in Kenya from 2000–2021* [Master's thesis, University of Nairobi]. University of Nairobi Repository. <https://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke>
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Lecocq, B., & Schrijver, P. (2007). The war on terror in a haze of dust: Potholes and pitfalls on the Saharan front. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 25(1), 141–166.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02589000601157053>
- Luckham, R. (2003). *Governing insecurity: Democratic control of military and security establishments in transitional democracies*. Zed Books.
- Maurice. (2020). *Islamic extremists in Africa: Security spotlight on Kenya and Nigeria*. ResearchGate.
- Menkhaus, K. (2014). Al-Shabaab's threat to Kenya: A political and military analysis. *African Affairs*, 113(452), 24–39.
- Moe, L. W. (2018). *Counterinsurgency in Somalia: Lessons from Kenya's operation Linda Nchi*. Chatham House. [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94\\_2\\_06\\_Moe.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/images/ia/INTA94_2_06_Moe.pdf)
- Munuve, I. (2024). *Implications of internal security operations on mental health in Turkana County, Kenya (2011–2020)*.



- Ojo, J. S. (2023). Shock and awe: Military response to armed banditry and the prospects of internal security operations in northwest Nigeria. *African Security Review*, 32(4), 1–17.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10246029.2023.2246432>
- Okoli, A. C., & Orinya, S. (2022). Horizontal inequalities and violent conflicts in Nigeria: A structural analysis. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 22(3), 221–240.  
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0095327X221121656>
- Olasunkanmi, O. O. (2016). Democracy consolidation and governance of the security sector in Nigeria: Trends and challenges. *Journal of International Studies*, 12, 127–143.
- Omelicheva, M., Carter, B., & Campbell, L. B. (2017). Military aid and human rights: Assessing the impact of U.S. security assistance programs. *Political Science Quarterly*, 132(1), 119–144.  
[https://nwc.ndu.edu/Portals/71/Images/Publications/Military%20Aid%20and%20Human%20Rights\\_Assessing%20the%20Impact%20of%20US%20Security%20Assistance%20Programs.pdf](https://nwc.ndu.edu/Portals/71/Images/Publications/Military%20Aid%20and%20Human%20Rights_Assessing%20the%20Impact%20of%20US%20Security%20Assistance%20Programs.pdf)
- Omondi, D. (2012). Kenya's military intervention in Somalia: A case study. *African Journal of Political Science*, 6(1), 57–70.
- Onuoha, F. (2015). Nigeria's counterinsurgency strategy: The impact of military operations on Boko Haram. *Journal of Terrorism and Political Violence*, 27(4), 612–634.
- Stearns, J. K. (2012). *From CNDP to M23: The evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo*. Rift Valley Institute. <https://riftvalley.net/publication/cndp-m23-evolution-armed-movement-eastern-congo>
- Umar, M. S., & Adamu, T. (2025). The ethics of counterinsurgency operations in Nigeria: Addressing human rights concerns. *Journal of African Security Studies*, 18(2), 125–140.  
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/18335330.2025.2449675>
- Watts, S., Johnston, T., & Miller, L. (2017). Intelligence and counterinsurgency: The role of technological innovation. RAND Corporation. [https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RR1539.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1539.html)
- Williams, P. D. (2016). *War and conflict in Africa* (2nd ed.). Polity Press.